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Conteúdo (article):

Josué de Castro e as operações políticas de combate à fome no Brasil
Josué de Castro and policy operations to combat hunger in Brazil

Adriana Salay Leme
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3608-5766
Faculdade de Saúde Pública – Universidade de São Paulo
Email: adrianasalay@gmail.com

Abstract: This article examines the operation of projects to combat hunger in Brazil by way of one of the main names involved in this fight. Josué de Castro, a doctor and geographer from Pernambuco, was Chair of the FAO Council, professor at several universities and a federal congressman for the state of Pernambuco. His presence in these various different arenas makes him an especially suitable actor though whom to examine the social workings of a public policy. The study focused on alliance-building around Brazil’s Social Security Food Service, National Food Commission, the World Association for the Struggle Against Hunger and partnering with the International Children’s Emergency Fund. By examining his personal collection of more than 30,000 documents and the press of the period, it was found that, although the policies were formulated and their public image crafted to present them as technical and impersonal in nature, they were implemented by way of operations working through personal ties and political networks formed by Josué de Castro. Also, they faced various kinds of challenge, including lack of funding, misuse and operational difficulties. The intention here is not to propose how things should have been nor to judge the effectiveness of such projects, but to understand how, in fact, they happened.

Keywords: endemic hunger, public policy, Brazil, history.

INTRODUCTION
The abundance of studies of food policy making between 1940 and 1960 reflects the emergence of these policies.1-3 Analyses of the processes entailed in their administration and operation are still incipient, however, because these call for sources of a different order, such as personal collections. This article thus proposes what in Anthropology is termed an ethnography of public policy4 or the social life of projects5 in order to observe public policy and project operations designed to combat hunger in Brazil. The intention is not to judge their effectiveness nor to propose what should have happened, but to understand how certain prescriptions to solve the problem of hunger were implemented in practice.
This article traces those pathways by reference to Josué de Castro, an essential figure in the struggle against hunger. The analysis draws on his personal collection of more than 30,000 documents, together with press reports from the 1940s and 1950s. Castro, who was born in Recife in September 1908 and died in exile in Paris in 1973, trained in Medicine, but worked on many different fronts: he was a university professor, geographer, chaired the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Council and served both in the state bureaucracy and as an elected federal congressman for the state of Pernambuco for the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB).
Of all these diverse roles, the focus here will be on unpublished information about his party political and governmental activities directed to ensuring effective implementation of policies to combat endemic hunger, working particularly with Brazil’s Social Security Food and Nutrition Service (Serviço de Alimentação da Previdência Social, SAPS) and National Food and Nutrition Commission (Comissão Nacional de Alimentação, CNA).
Founded in 1940, the SAPS offered soup kitchens, subsidised vegetable and fruit markets and other services. The CNA was set up in 1945 under the National Foreign Trade Commission (Conselho Nacional de Comércio Exterior), but migrated in 1949 to the Ministry of Education and Health. With Castro at its head, the CNA housed the FAO representation and organised Brazil’s first national school meals programme6. Accordingly, the study examined relations between these activities and the World Association to Combat Hunger (Associação Mundial de Luta contra a Fome, Ascofam), founded in 1957 by Josué de Castro and his allies, as well as the agreements signed with the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).
The UNICEF signed an agreement with Brazil in 1950 and installed a local representation in João Pessoa, but soon moved to Rio de Janeiro, where the representative, Gertrude Lutz, formed close ties with Josué de Castro. From 1953 onwards, the United States, the UNICEF’s main source of funding, began to press for its farm produce surpluses to be bought and delivered to the countries served by the UNICEF, even if at modest prices. Nearly half the early shipments from the agency were of powdered milk, margarine and vitamin capsules. In this way, the United States disposed of its surpluses and, at the same time, boosted its political influence7. School meals programmes were starting to figure on the horizon of UNICEF activities, a policy development that, in Brazil, aligned well with the plans of Josué de Castro and his group at the CNA.
That same year, in order to bolster the CNA, a budget amendment was requested redirecting part of SAPS funding to the CNA, whose budget would swell from 2 million to 5 million cruzeiros. Withdrawal of that amount from the Plano Salte was authorised by President Getúlio Vargas, so as to enable the commission to carry out the activities it had planned, which included the school meals programme8. Thus, in March or April 1954, the CNA made the first deliveries of powdered milk from the UNICEF to the national school meals programme. There is little documentation of this early period. What is known is that only a few destinations were chosen, among them the states of Pernambuco, Bahia and Espírito Santo. News of the agreement among the CNA, the UNICEF and the recipient states circulated in the press9. Castro sent a message to Vargas announcing the start of the operation10. Days after receiving the telegram, however, Vargas took his own life. With the rise of Café Filho – and the opposition – to the presidency, Castro lost a considerable part of his political network in the federal government and found himself deprived of political capital with which to maintain his influence in that and other circles he moved in.
A CANDIDATE “WITH NO GREAT ECONOMIC MEANS”
1954 was election campaign year and Josué de Castro stood as federal congressman for the Popular Autonomist Movement (Movimento Popular Autonomista), formed by his party, the PTB, the social democratic party (Partido Social Democrático, PSD) and other smaller parties, as the “candidate able to satisfy the elites and the masses”11. On this occasion, he had the support of the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, PCB), which had been banned in 1947, during the Dutra government, and could not field candidates. For this election, Josué negotiated union backing, specifically from the Pernambuco Workers’ Advisory Council (Conselho Consultivo dos Trabalhadores de Pernambuco), formed by four federations and 47 trade unions in the state12. He was also supported by part of the Pernambuco intelligentsia, which published a manifesto in favour of his candidacy13.
Castro, whose roots were in the middle classes, was not the candidate with the deepest pockets. On the contrary, he was a candidate “without great economic means”. Wilson de Barros Leal, who was running for city councillor in Recife for the PTB, was expecting financial backing from Castro. He described the financial hardships of being Castro’s base and reminded him that monetary backing was required, in order to gain possible supporters with electoral potential14.
It is not known whether or not other funding was forthcoming, but in 1956 Castro wrote to João Goulart, president of the PTB, “that it was essential to consider the need to assign the delegacy of one of the quasi-independent government agencies to Wilson Barros Leal, in consideration for the constant and inestimable services that he is rendering so ably and loyally to the Party”15. A network of relations was constructed and cultivated in letters and conversations, in which both sides bore moral obligations towards what was agreed. In this case, not having recourse to substantial financial capital, Castro availed himself of his social capital in order to marshal allies by recommending them for government positions.
According to Castro and his followers, his life was “consecrated to the wellbeing of humankind” and his “past of struggles, his self-denial, his integral character and his enormous heart are the guarantee of our most ardent nationalist hopes”16. In 1954, Castro was elected with 14,076 votes, of which “8,000 came from the semi-arid high sertão, zones of voter corralling”, which Castro described as won over with speeches and propaganda17. Castro created a representation of himself as distant from the modus operandi of party politics and the State, which hinged on exchanges of favours.
Castro left the command of the CNA after taking his seat in Congress in 1955. Even had he not stepped down, conditions were no longer as favourable. Getúlio Vargas’s suicide had left his group unprotected in the CNA, which was now the responsibility of Minister Cândido Mota Filho, of the Republican Party (Partido Republicano, PR), in opposition to the PTB. The school meals programme was steadily growing and it was not in the minister’s interest to have a programme in the CNA that was not only expanding vigorously, but housed a group of Castro’s allies. Accordingly, Mota Filho submitted a draft proposal to the presidency to set up a National School Meals Campaign (Campanha Nacional de Merenda Escolar, CNME) to be managed by the Ministry of Education, adding that an experimental campaign had been run “with the cooperation of the CNA”18 (p. 377). In 1955, Decree No. 37.106 set up the CNME within the Ministry of Education and Culture, under the command of Salvador Julianelli, a member appointed by the new minister.
Despite this unfavourable state of affairs, Castro continued to influence the commission and a number of requests, such as for expansion of the school meals programme, were directed to him19. Appointments were also routed through him, particularly in Pernambuco. In January 1955, Castro told Jamesson Ferreira Lima, his chief ally and arranger in Pernambuco, that “in response to a request by Costa Porto to the Minister of Education, Mr. Mario Andrade is to be appointed Regional Delegate in Recife”20. Jamesson was probably expecting to be promoted himself, because he was already Castro’s ally and a CNA technical assistant in Pernambuco, a post with little prestige. Nonetheless, the position was granted to Mario Andrade and he too became an ally from the outset, further spreading Castro’s political network. Castro had to intervene in the CNME representation in Pernambuco to ensure he stayed: “After fighting hard, I have managed to ensure that he will continue definitively at the head of the School Meals Campaign”21.
Now, as a federal congressman, Castro was held to account by the network he had built up: “I recognise your present position in relation to the government, but after all, the word of Josué de Castro is still the word of Josué de Castro”22. Nonetheless, his position in the Legislative did not give him the penetration necessary to meet the various demands that arose, because he had lost a considerable portion of his political capital in the federal Executive23,24.
The election of Juscelino Kubitschek in 1955 brought Castro back into the hegemonic group in the federal Executive, affording him much greater scope for action. Kubitschek, a member of the PSD in Minas Gerais, had been supported by the PTB during the election campaign. It is not known exactly when he and Castro began to work more closely together, but the latter became the president’s advisor on food matters25.
ASCOFAM AND HUNGER MANAGEMENT
Early in 1957 Josué de Castro had founded the Ascofam. The association was concentrated in three nuclei: one in Europe, centred in France and Switzerland; one in Rio de Janeiro, where the national office was located, with Souza Barros, a Pernambucan living in Rio, as its secretary; and the third, with head office in Recife, operated in that state capital and towns in the interior of Pernambuco and, in isolated cases, in other towns in northeastern Brazil.
The work of maintaining the association was done, in Rio de Janeiro, by Josué de Castro and Souza Barros and, in Recife, by Gilberto Costa Carvalho (who was briefly the first regional delegate), Jameson Ferreira Lima (who replaced Costa Carvalho) and Mário Andrade. The association played two prominent roles: as a promotor of hunger awareness and as a force for food assistance policies in Pernambuco, particularly as regards powdered milk distribution and the production of cassava flour fortified with soya, both in partnership with components of the government apparatus where Castro wielded influence.
Jamesson Ferreira Lima, the CNA’s regional technical assistant in Pernambuco, became regional secretary to the Ascofam in the Northeast26 and managed the regional association, as did Mário Andrade, who was CNME representative in Pernambuco and took on the position as the Ascofam’s regional treasurer27. These multiple functions and their holders’ relations with Castro led to a number of public cooperation agreements between the association and components of the State apparatus, including the CNA28. As a result, some of these “cooperation agreements” were forged through these agents representing the two groups.
Given this active participation in the apparatus of government, Josué was able to speak at a number of inaugurations of new CNA service-provision units29. In addition, it has to be remembered that he recommended appointments in other areas dealing with food and nutrition. In June 1958, he managed to have Jamesson appointed to command the Supply and Price Commission (Comissão de Abastecimento e Preços, Coap) in Pernambuco30, a hierarchically higher and much better paid position. In 1956 he nominated Antonio Rego Vilar to head the SAPS regional delegacy in the state31. All this circulation, together with Castro’s prestige in the field, made it possible to operate the agreements and facilitated collaboration among the various different agencies. These were thus not impersonal arrangements, as would be supposed on an idealised view of the bureaucracy; they came about through the agents involved at the various levels of the state bureaucracy and in non-governmental associations, such as the Ascofam. In short, although not formally part of the CNA or the SAPS, Castro wielded strong influence in these “agencies that obeyed the directions of Professor Josué de Castro”32.
This flow of favours and appointments went on not only in Pernambuco. Castro managed to promote one ally, for instance, through President Juscelino Kubitschek33. Castro travelled around Brazil with Kubitschek to inaugurate public works. In 1958, he went to Pernambuco and Maranhão in the presidential plane34. Castro was campaigning for the election in which he would stand as federal congressman for the PTB and Pernambuco.
At that time, the SAPS also partnered with the Ascofam and Castro came to exert intense influence on the service. In 1957 and 1958, the SAPS ran an expansion programme in Pernambuco for which Castro had requested funding directly from the President of the Republic35. The inaugurations, publicised in the press in inserts paid for by the service, included a food distribution post in the municipality of Vitória de Santo Antão, which was opened in October 1957 with thanks to the president, Josué de Castro and Colonel Benedito Arcanjo da Costa Lima, general director of the SAPS36. March 1958 saw the opening of a “supermarket of the most modern kind, set up in Caruaru”37 (p. 3). Josué de Castro had been responsible for raising the necessary funding for the project and even visited the town38.
Other SAPS posts were inaugurated, in June 1958, in the town of Pesqueira39, in upstate Pernambuco, and in the Boa Vista40 and Casa Forte41 districts of Recife. All the openings were publicised in the local press by Antonio Rego Vilar and were accompanied by thanks to Congressman Josué de Castro and Colonel Benedito Arcanjo da Costa Lima. In August 1958, two cassava flour mills were also inaugurated in Caruaru and Araripina in a partnership between the SAPS, Coap and Ascofam42.
Also in 1958, in addition to the various SAPS services being launched, Castro continued to be a central to the distribution of powdered milk. The requests for milk shipments were issued by Castro in telegrams specifying they should be delivered to the SAPS43. His work was concentrated in Pernambuco, but he was regarded nationally as the person in charge of powdered milk distribution. Leonel Brizola, for instance, resorted to him when he needed 164 tonnes of powdered milk not to be distributed by health posts, but by mayors and deputy mayors in Rio Grande do Sul44. Castro also organised specific donations of milk, such as one to the town of Santo Amaro in Pernambuco, in June 195845. Milk distribution was used in the elections, as described in a letter from Dorgival de Oliveira: “the milk obtained before the elections and distributed to the people of the Club was a source of satisfaction for them to vote for the professor’s name”. That ally, in exchange for the support he gave Castro, wanted to be transferred to Rio de Janeiro as an assistant46.
These manoeuvrings did not go unnoticed by his adversaries, who attributed his 1958 election victory – as the most voted federal congressman in Pernambuco, with 33,657 votes – to the milk from the UNICEF47. The press accused Castro of promising jobs in the Ascofam and of using the association to employ campaign workers48.
Distribution of powdered milk was simpler for the Ascofam than the fortified cassava flour49, because the milk supply chain had been set up previously and had steady funding. The proposal to enrich flour with protein-rich foods, such as soya, was experimental and began to be tested as a measure against endemic hunger in 1958. Protein deficiency, known in its most severe form as Kwashiorkor50, was a constant presence in scientific studies of food and nutrition, and the milk and soya were both destined for the endeavour to counter this component of endemic hunger.
An agreement signed in 1958 between the Ascofam and the Brazilian Assistance Legion (Legião Brasileira de Assistência, LBA) earmarked three million cruzeiros for executing the flour enrichment project for one year1. An area was chosen for start-up testing of the work with fortified flour: in Surubim, a municipality in Pernambuco, nine families, 51 individuals in all, were selected from the community to receive one kilo of fortified flour per person per week. They were monitored by the nutrologist, Nivaldo Barbosa de Souza, to measure the effect of the diet on clinical conditions produced by endemic hunger, including pellagra, a disease caused by vitamin B3 deficiency. The results were positive and demonstrated a decrease in avitaminosis, particularly from lack of vitamin B2, and an improvement in the incidence of pellagra and anaemia52. As a result, the fortified flour project was set up in other localities where the Ascofam managed to enter into partnerships for installing what were called enrichment mills, with consisted of machines to mix the flour.
The idea was to expand supply so that the produce could be sold at SAPS posts, schools and factories under agreements with the LBA. Surplus flour was to be delivered free of charge to orphanages and be duly publicised53. The project operated in at least three towns: Recife, Caruaru and Araripina. “These mills were sited on a strictly scientific criterion reflecting both the problem of the flour’s being produced locally and whether it was habitually consumed by the local population”54. Notwithstanding the scientific rationale, Castro’s system of relations is known to have played a key role in the decision as to where the services would be installed, which institutions would benefit and what target-public would be served.
These SAPS-Ascofam-CNA partnerships for the production, distribution and sale of vitamin-enriched flour continued in place after the election year55. The same occurred with the milk for school meals, which was distributed in Pernambuco through a partnership between the Ascofam and the CNME, that is, through the alliance among Josué de Castro, Jamesson and Walter Santos, superintendent of the CNME at the time. The agreement provide for distribution, in institutions in the Northeast, of “powdered milk acquired under an arrangement with the United States government, in line with a programme formulated in common and the capacity of the CNME”56 (p. 10).
According to interview of Walter Santos by the Diário de Notícias newspaper, “UNICEF supplies powdered milk to 400,000 schoolchildren in the northeast, to 20,000 pre-schoolers in Amazônia and 40,000 in Central Brazil through the National School Meals Campaign”57-58. Castro had a hand in ensuring that milk would be destined for Pernambuco, as remarked by Valério de Castro Rodrigues, of the CNA in Pernambuco59.
Although the state of Pernambuco was intensely affected by chronic hunger at that time, the decisive factor shaping the criteria for milk distribution was given not by scientific studies, but rather by the social relations among the agents engaged in the project. Despite the fact that, formally, the project had been designed by experts and was justified by the metrics developed for endemic hunger, the dynamics underlying its execution did not form part of that original conception. It was concentrated in Pernambuco for two interrelated reasons: firstly, this was the state that had elected Josué de Castro and his “parliamentary duty” required that he raise funding for his state60. Also, and more importantly, for him to maintain and extend the system of social relations he had been building over the course of his trajectory, it needed nourishing with investment.
This can be seen not only in Castro’s intervening for the operation to be concentrated in Pernambuco, but also in the fact that, after conversations and partnering between the project’s regional manager and representatives of other institutions outside the state apparatus, these other institution also came to be served59. This is to say that associations, churches and other institutions distributed the powdered milk, each according to its specific modus operandi. The organisation in question, whether a church, association or trade union, would distribute the food it received to beneficiaries according to its own criteria, and not necessarily to the target publics specified by the experts and for which these programmes had been set up.
While, on the one hand, the milk deliveries earned press coverage praising the programme62, on the other, clearly antagonistic criticisms also appeared in newspapers allied with the sugarcane oligarchies, including the Diário de Pernambuco,: “this UNICEF milk has been the subject of various controversies here: the communists said the milk caused blindness; now it has been discovered that the milk has been offered to ice cream factories; and it is also being said that this milk is so fatty and nutritious it has even elected some to congress63 (p. 4).
RESULTS
The official image of the proposals and projects formulated by experts contrasted with the operations resulting from the State’s increasingly dense efforts to combat endemic hunger. It was important that the public representation maintain the image of a technical endeavour remote from political disputes: [it is] “essential for the good of all to give Ascofam (Ascofam meaning Josué de Castro) an impersonal, technical character, an apolitical character. A number of people invited to sponsor or take technical roles have made their acceptance conditional on the institution’s being disconnected from any political leaning”64. Its operations, however, as has been seen, obeyed other dynamics, which were neither impersonal nor apolitical. On the contrary, they were instrumental in maintaining the political network necessary for the projects to be implemented.
In addition to these characteristics, it has to be considered that execution of public policy encountered a variety of situations that were not mentioned in constructing its image. These included (i) lack of product and of funding, (ii) operational difficulties, (iii) misuse, (iv) grievances and (v) refusal to follow prescriptions. Let us consider each of these situations.
Shortages of product and funding: product was always short. Although the powdered milk deliveries were concentrated in Pernambuco, they were always insufficient to meet demand. This was a recurrent theme in the letters exchanged between Castro and the Ascofam and CNA administrators65. As a result, many organisations’ requests for milk were not met66. The problem of lack of funds with which to pay workers, as well as the lack of installations and suppliers, was not exclusive to the CNA or Ascofam67. At a meeting of the various services tackling the issue of food and nutrition and combating hunger with a view to the World Hunger Campaign, organised by the FAO and with Castro and Ascofam playing a leading role, the SAPS representative, Pedro Borges, raised objections, such as that “the problem with all the agencies at the moment is lack of funding. He said that the SAPS is in very poor financial condition and even in debt to its suppliers”68. The CAN reported the same: “As regards the Campaign to End Hunger, Dr Walter Santos declared that the first step should be to expand existing programmes. He then spoke of the problems in providing assistance, where the programme could not be operated for lack of funds; some milk dispensaries even had to be closed down”. Castro replied, however, that “he did not want to discuss funding problems with the President [of the Republic]” and that “the important thing was to make the country aware of the problem of hunger through publications and conferences”68.
The operational difficulties were numerous and some have already been mentioned. In addition to the lack of funds and material, which hindered programme execution, the bureaucracy sometimes impounded goods and hampered port clearance. In one case, foodstuffs donated by the United States – “hundreds of tonnes of cornmeal, wheat, powdered milk, edible oils, pastas and other foods” – were held up for more than two years in the port of Recife69. Problems transporting the products were also frequent: these could be a truck broken down70 or lack of a vehicle to ship the soya from the port of Recife to enrich the cassava flour32. Another difficulty was administering the amounts and distribution flows of the products, some of which were highly perishable71. This was the case with soy flour, for instance, which could be repurposed as animal feed, but this meant project losses and lack of material for enrichment activities, as at Caruaru and the Peixinhos district of Recife.
Misuse: Castro learned of one such case involving a priest in the Cajueiro district of Recife, who received the milk to be donated, but sold it to pay off debts. The intermediary was Olinto Costa, nephew of an important figure in the city whom we know only as Otávio. Olinto’s buyer was a known smuggler, who offered the milk to ice cream manufacturers. In this way, the UNICEF milk, which should be feeding hungry children, ended up in the Sorveteria Xaxa ice cream factory, which reported the fact to the Diário de Pernambuco and Folha da Manhã newspapers72.
Grievances: these arose when the project was ill-suited to the needs or expectations of the target public and included a request from trade unions in Pernambuco for Castro to revoke the “decision to supply UNICEF milk only to the under-5s”73. That restriction was imposed because the amount of milk available could not meet the needs of all children and the target public had to be delimited on some criterion.
Refusal to follow prescriptions: this happened especially with the soy-enriched flour. Some schools reported that the children could not bear eating the same thing day after day and the people who received or purchased the flour complained that it contained weevils and larvas74.
None of this is to say that the projects failed. It is not intended here to make success or failure key to the analysis, but rather to describe the ways of operating that became established in the wake of the scientific prescriptions formulated for the State to engage with the management of endemic hunger. To that end, Castro made use of his position as a congressman, the alliances he built and his association, the Ascofam. Despite the commonly-held idea that assistance and the practices of associations of organised civil society are separate from the action of the State75, here both interweave, as was the case among the Ascofam, CNA, LBA and international agencies, such as the UNICEF.

FINAL REMARKS
The public policy prescriptions directed to combating endemic hunger were formulated by technical experts and produced an idealised conception of how they should be implemented. This ideal was forged in the modern sense and hinged on an efficient market and an impersonal process. Publicly, they upheld scientific guidelines, in that they operated outside political networks and took account only of data produced by experts and the technical implementation of mechanisms to combat endemic hunger. They rested on a coherent system of representations75. However, their implementation and the choices involved responded to a variety of other variables and contingencies. There thus existed a public image of policymaking to combat endemic hunger, while “the relations that constitute the political universe”60 (p. 16) were often downplayed. Those relations, however, were central to, and framed, the operation and execution of the mechanisms set up by the government to combat hunger. As a result, they embodied – in the terms of James Scott – “public transcripts” and “hidden transcripts”76.
The main feature toned down by the public representation was that implementation came about through relations with leaders in other areas. As seen above, these involved mainly alliances forged by Castro between the federal Executive and local leaders in Pernambuco. The political network functioned as a set of relations of interdependence, which were asymmetrical because of the power differentials among the social actors involved. The local leaders had bargaining power proportional to the political capital they offered to the relationship. That is to say that Castro depended on these leaders to get elected and maintain his position, especially because he spent little time in Pernambuco. At the same time, these leaders benefited from the alliances with Castro, either in the form of the posts they occupied, amendments to the federal budget or the powdered milk they redistributed to their bases. These relations occupied a central place in policy execution and were structural to the social relations investigated here. This was no deviation from proper practice, then, but the manner in which policy was operationalised effectively.
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19. Limoeiro – um busto do ex-presidente Vargas para a cidade. Diário de Pernambuco, 1954 Ago 29. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
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21. Carta de Josué de Castro a Mário Andrade, 1956 Abr 10. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 587. Brasil.
22. Carta a Josué de Castro, 1955 Abr 27. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 436. Brasil.
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25. Carta de Josué de Castro ao “Meu caro chefe e amigo”, 1955 Dez 31. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 552. Brasil.
26. Leite em pó – 200 toneladas para Pernambuco. Diário de Pernambuco, 1957 Jun 5. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
27. 405 escolas desta capital foram atendidas com a merenda escolar. Correio do Povo, 1960 Dez 20. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, Bndigital. Brasil.
28. Carta de Pedro a Josué de Castro, Ouricuri, 1958 Jun 29. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 571. Brasil.
29. Inaugurados ontem postos alimentares. Jornal do Comércio, 1957 Out 23. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
30. O Caso da COAP. Diário de Pernambuco, 24 de junho de 1958. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
31. Diário de Pernambuco, 1956 Abr 26. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
32. Carta de Jamesson Ferreira Lima a Souza Barros, 1959 Abr 1. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 288. Brasil.
33. Telegrama de Josué de Castro a Juscelino Kubitschek, 1959 Jun 30. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 565. Brasil.
34. Tribuna da Imprensa, 1958 Fev 10. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
35. “Presidente ordenou ao diretor SAPS remessa imediata três milhões que chegarão aí na próxima semana”. Telegrama de Josué de Castro para SAPS Recife, 1958 Dez 12. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 401. Brasil.
36. Aviso. Diário de Pernambuco, 1957 Out 27. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
37. O SAPS em Caruaru. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Mar 4. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
38. O SAPS em Caruaru. O deputado Josué de Castro faz promessas. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Abr 23. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
39. Posto do SAPS. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Mai 30. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
40. SAPS Auto-Serviço da Boa Vista. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Jun 14. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
41. SAPS Auto-Serviço da Casa Forte. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Jun 21. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
42. Já se acha funcionando o posto de beneficiamento de farinha de mandioca. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Ago 10. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
43. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 561. Brasil.
44. Telegrama de Leonel Brizola a Josué de Castro, 1957 Ago 13. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 569. Brasil.
45. Leite para Santo Amaro. Diário de Pernambuco, 13 de junho de 1958. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
46. Carta de Dorgival de Oliveira a Josué de Castro, [circa 1950]. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 583. Brasil.
47. Votação para deputado federal em Pernambuco. Diário de Pernambuco, 1958 Out 31. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
48. Josué utiliza o conto do emprego. O Jornal, 1958 Ago 16. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
49. A Ascofam enriquecerá alimentos. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 52. Brasil.
50. Brock JF, Autret M. Kwashiorkor in Africa. Geneva: World Health Organization; 1952.
51. Carta de Josué de Castro a Padre Joseph Lebret, 1958 Jul 24. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 571. Brasil.
52. Ascofam diz: mudança alimentar do Nordeste é uma tarefa de todos. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 44. Brasil.
53. Programa da Delegacia da Ascofam no Nordeste. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 436. Brasil.
54. Carta de Josué de Castro a Mario Pinotti, Rio de Janeiro, 1958 Jul 15. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 571. Brasil.
55. Diário de Pernambuco, 1959 Fev 14. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
56. Leite em pó para as Instituições Particulares de Ensino Gratuito. Diário de Notícias, 1960 Fev 11. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
57. Milhões de cruzeiros desviados da merenda escolar e leite do FISI para eleger Josué de Castro. Diário de Pernambuco, 1961 Mar 12. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
58. Terão Brasil uma grande indústria de leite em pó. Diário de Notícias, 1960 Abr 17. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
59. Carta de Valério de Castro Rodrigues a Josué de Castro, Recife, 1959 Mai 19. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 565. Brasil.
60. Bezerra MO. Em nome das “bases”: política, favor e dependência pessoal. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará; 1999.
61. A fome mata milhões e engorda Josué. Diário de Pernambuco, 1960 Fev 2. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 44. Brasil.
62. No Recife o sr. Josué de Castro. Correio da Manhã, 1954 Fev 10. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
63. O leite do FISI. Diário de Pernambuco, 1955 Mar 17. Localizado em: Acervo Fundação Biblioteca Nacional, BNDigital. Brasil.
64. Carta de Jamesson Ferreira Lima a Josué de Castro, Recife, 19961 Jul 3. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 564. Brasil.
65. Carta de Josué de Castro a Jean Claude Arès, Rio de Janeiro, 1960 Jul 25. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 157. Brasil.
66. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 643. Brasil.
67. Carta de Souza Barros a Mario de Andrade, Rio de Janeiro, 1959 Ago 4. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 298. Brasil.
68. Ata da reunião de 6 de junho de 1960 para lançamento da Campanha Mundial contra a Fome no Brasil. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 639. Brasil.
69. Desídia criminosa. O Jornal, 1965 Jan 15. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 44. Brasil.
70. Carta de Souza Barros a Gilberto, [circa 1950]. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 420. Brasil.
71. Relatório da Ascofam para a Sudene. Plano de Nutrição para o Nordeste – Delegacia Regional. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 643. Brasil.
72. Carta de Mário Andrade a Josué de Castro, Recife, 1955 Mar 19. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 72. Brasil.
73. Carta do Sindicato dos Distribuidores e Vendedores de Jornais e Revistas em Pernambuco a Josué de Castro, Recife, 1959 Jan 12. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 561. Brasil.
74. Carta de José Nivaldo a Josué de Castro, Surubim, 1959 Abr 10. Localizado em: Acervo Josué de Castro, Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; Pasta 560. Brasil.
75. Fassin D, Pandolfi M, organizadores. Contemporary states of emergency. Cambridge: Zone Books, 2010.
76. Scott J. Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve human condition have failed. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1998.